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Recent Decisions
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - CAUSATION - FORESEEABILITY - The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that harm resulting from the raising of
a snow swirl by a bus passing at high speed is not the product of a fore-
seeable risk or hazard which could render this conduct negligent.
Metts v. Griglak, 438 Pa. 392, 264 A.2d 684 (1970).
Joseph H. Metts was a passenger in a Perry Bus Lines coach which was
following several car lengths behind an automobile driven by Mrs.
Helen R. Harshman. Both vehicles were traveling at approximately
30 to 35 miles per hour in the far right hand lane of a four lane divided
highway which was slippery and covered with ice and snow. They
were passed by a Greyhound bus traveling in the immediate left hand
lane at approximately 60 miles per hour, 10 miles per hour over the
posted speed limit. In passing the two vehicles, the Greyhound bus
splashed slush and raised a cloud of snow which obscured the vision
of the other drivers. Although unable to see, the Perry bus driver con-
tinued without reducing his speed. When his vision of the road cleared
he observed the Harshman automobile skidding but was unable to
avoid colliding with it. Neither vehicle was utilizing chains, nor was
the Perry bus driver using the sander with which his bus was equipped.
At the time of the accident, the Greyhound bus was out of sight.
Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against the Perry Bus Lines, its
driver and Mrs. Harshman for injuries resulting from the rear end
collision. Mrs. Harshman filed a third party complaint joining Grey-
hound and averring that the collision was the direct result of their
bus. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against all
the defendants including Greyhound; subsequently the court granting
Greyhound's motion for a judgment n.o.v. This decision was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.1
Speaking for the majority, Justice Pomeroy2 ruled:
... that if Greyhound was negligent, its negligence lay only in
exceeding the speed limit. The harm suffered by Metts, however,
was not the result of a risk the foreseeability of which rendered
Greyhound's excessive speed negligent. Rather that harm was
attributable to Greyhound's nonnegligent raising of a snow swirl
and the subsequent and unforeseeable negligence of Perry and
Mrs. Harshman.8
1. Metts v. Griglak, 438 Pa. 392, 264 A.2d 684 (1970).
2. Chief Justice Bell concurred in the result. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion.
3. Metts v. Griglak, 438 Pa. 392, 398-99, 264 A.2d 684, 688 (1970).
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On appeal the decisive issue was whether the injury to Metts resulted
from a risk or hazard, the foreseeability of which could render the
conduct of the Greyhound bus negligent. In resolving this issue the
court relied on Brusis v. Henkels, 376 Pa. 226, 102 A.2d 146 (1954)
and Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951)4 for the
proposition that only those risks or hazards which are foreseeable could
render Greyhound negligent.5 Assuming Greyhound owed some duty
to exercise reasonable care to fellow travelers, the court proceeded to
fragment the risks of driving under these circumstances and found
that, although other reasonably foreseeable risks might easily be imag-
ined,6 the risk of an accident resulting from a snow swirl was not
among them.7 Even assuming negligence on the part of Greyhound,
the intervening negligence of the Perry bus driver was sufficiently
extraordinary as to be a risk unforseeable to Greyhound."
In conclusion, the court agreed with the lower court's finding that
snow swirls, caused by passing motorists, are a normal risk of driving
and are practically speaking unavoidable. To support this argument
the court analogized this situation to the dangers created by the head-
lights of an oncoming car. In addition, the court stated that no case
had been found to support the theory of Mrs. Harshman.
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts, set forth the follow-
ing arguments: 1) though the majority found no case to support the
theory of the third party complaint, no case had been cited holding
4. The importance of this case in defining the role of foreseeability in determining
negligence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of Palsgraf v. Long Island
R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, (1928) is set forth in an article by Eldredge, "The Role
of Foreseeable Consequences in Negligence Law", 23 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 158 (1951-52).
5. It should be noted that the problem in both the cited cases was that of the un-
foreseeable plaintiff. The issue in the latter as stated by the court: "Was plaintiff within
that group of people to whom a reasonable man could foresee an injury under these
circumstances?" Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 426, 84 A.2d 289, 291 (1951).
6. The court here cites the RESTrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 281, comment e (1965).
"Thus the duty to exercise reasonable care in driving an automobile down the highway
is established for the protection of the persons or property of others against all of the
unreasonable possibilities of harm which may be expected to result from collisions with
other vehicles, or with pedestrians, or from the driver's own automobile leaving the high-
way, or from narrowly averted collisions or other accidents. When harm of a kind
normally to be expected as a consequence of the negligent driving results from the realiza-
tion of any one of these hazards, it is within the scope of the defendant's duty of
protection."
7. "But in the case at hand, we cannot say that a collision occurring when the Grey-
hound bus was over one-half mile from the scene, and alleged to have resulted from the
creation of a snow swirl (or the throwing of slush) was a harm within the risk foreseeably
created by Greyhound's operation of its bus at an excessive speed." Metts v. Griglak, 438
Pa. 392, 397, 264 A.2d 684, 687 (1970).
8. The court cites the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965) to support this
conclusion.
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there was no liability in this situation;" 2) it was a jury question as to
whether Greyhound's conduct was negligent and the risk foreseeable;
3) finding Greyhound was out of sight when the accident occurred
was irrelevant; and, 4) it is clearly foreseeable under these circum-
stances that passing motorists will obscure the vision of others.
The court's approach to the problem of the scope of liability,
through the concept of foreseeability of the risk, can not be faulted
for lack of authority.10 However, it is necessary to be aware of what
is taking place by the utilization of this approach. Although it is some-
times accomplished under the concept of proximate cause, Pennsyl-
vania, in using the doctrine of foreseeable consequences, has placed
a great deal of the scope of liability problem under the question of
duty." The specific mode of analysis used in Metts was risk fragmenta-
tion, which looks to and analyzes harm in terms of specific risks, the
foreseeability of which renders conduct negligent.' 2 Its utilization
stems from the adoption by Pennsylvania of Justice Cardoza's rational
in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), and
the position taken by the Restatement of Torts. 13
The problem with the utilization of a risk fragmentation approach
is the limitation it places on the consideration of what in some cases
may be the very difficult question of how far negligence goes before
we cut off liability. 14 If one looks only at the risk of one specific type
9. As stated by Chief Justice Stem in Hudson, Admrx. v. Grace, 348 Pa. 175, 176-77,
34 A.2d 498, 499-500 (1943):
While no case is reported in Pennsylvania with the same factual situation as that
which gave rise to the present litigation, there is not involved here the application
of any new doctrine in the law of negligence. Human life is so complex that the cir-
cumstances attending the happening of different accidents are correspondingly varied,
but the principle of liability is simple and constant, being based on the proposition
that one who, by sub-standard conduct, causes injury to another is legally responsible
therefore if the harmful consequences of such conduct could reasonably have been
foreseen.
10. Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951); Brusis v. Henkels, 376 Pa.
226, 102 A.2d 146 (1954).
11. "Whether there is to be such an obligation is a matter of policy; of the end to be
accomplished; and when we say that the defendant is or is not under a 'duty' to protect
the plaintiff against such consequences, 'duty' is only a word, and no more with which
we state our conclusion." W. PROSSER, TORTS § 49, at 287 (3d ed. 1964).
12. "Sometime the foreseeability limitation is stated in a form which on its face,
would seem to narrow the scope of liability. It is said that the defendant's responsibility
must be limited to harm which results from the particular risk or hazard which he has
created." W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50, at 292 (3d ed. 1964).
13. ".... the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would
be the orbit of the duty . . . The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 343-44, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928). See Eldredge, "The Role of Foreseeable Consequences in Negligence Law", 23 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 158 (1951-52).
14. "If the defendant could not reasonably forsee any injury as the result Pf his act,
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of accident, and asks is this one of the things that I have to worry
about, further discussion of other relevant factors in determining the
scope of liability may be precluded. By fragmenting the risk, one is
asking in isolation whether a duty is owed as to the risk of a specific
type of occurrence and the answer, if an unusual factual situation is
present or a novel approach to recovery is raised (as in Metts), should
in all such cases be in the negative. This answer follows since the
determination of negligence is a process of gauging probabilities and
not mere possibilities.1" This is clearly the result by a close inspection
of the elements normally used to determine unreasonable conduct, i.e.,
probability of harm, severity of harm and the burden of precaution. 6
If we fragment the risk, the probability factor goes down and we are
left with conduct, as in Metts, which cannot be termed negligent when
considered in the total balance.
Thus, it would appear fragmentation of the risk may ask the wrong
question at the wrong time in the negligence formula. Metts illustrates
this point in the difficult cause in fact question it presents, i.e., whether
Greyhound's speeding contributed in the creation of the snow swirl
to the plaintiff's injury. This question, as well as the issue of inter-
vening negligence, does not have to be resolved since the court has
determined at the outset an absence of unreasonable conduct on the
part of Greyhound towards the plaintiff. 17
If one of the effects of risk fragmentation is to preclude the dis-
cussion of such issues as I have mentioned above, it is submitted that
the court must be doing more than is evident from a strict application
or if his conduct was reasonable in the light of what he could anticipate, there is no
negligence, and no liability. But what if he does unreasonably fail to guard against harm
which he should foresee, and consequences which he could in no way have anticipated
in fact follow?" W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50, at 288 (3d ed. 1964).
15. "In the ordinary conduct of the affairs of life, there is no duty on anyone to anti-
cipate and provide against the remotely possible ... ." White v. Roydhouse, 211 Pa. 13, 17,
60 A. 316, 317 (1905). "Want of ordinary care consists in failure to anticipate what is
reasonably probable-not what is remotely possible." Camp v. Allegheny County, 263 Pa.
276, 282, 106 A. 314, 316 (1919), "Liability for negligence depends on antecedent prob-
ability, not the mere possibility of harmful results therefrom." Venzel v. Valley Camp
Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583, 590, 156 A. 240, 242 (1931).
16. "Foreseeability of consequences, or, as it is sometimes called, the risk of harm, is
only one of the factors which are important in determining negligence. Into the scale
with it there must also be thrown the gravity of the harm if it is to occur, and against
both must be balanced the utility of the challenged conduct." W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50, at
306 (3d ed. 1964).
17. The court does take note of the cause in fact issue in a footnote on page 398 of
the opinion in considering the lower court's findings that snow swirls are an unavoidable
hazard of driving. The issue of intervening negligence was dealt with based on the as-
sumption that Greyhound was negligent, but the finding of extraordinary negligence
breaking the causation chain does not disturb the court's initial finding of no unreason-
able conduct by Greyhound.
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of this approach. In anlyzing a negligence problem in this manner,
and dismissing the case at this point, the court must have, or should
have, considered numerous additional factors which are relevant to
the determination of the scope of liability, particularly when the
theory of recovery could open new doors to litigation. Among these
additional factors are allocation of risk, economic burden, other
factually or theortically analogous precedent, common sense and
justice.i8 Though the end result may very well be the same, it is
still a considered evaluation and therefore does not fit neatly into
the mould of risk fragmentation or the analysis of foreseeability as
such.
Thus, it is submitted the court is deciding the potential liability
problem almost entirely on the foreseeability issue and using risk
fragmentation to justify the result. The court's consideration of other
questions raised by the case does not diminish the impact of the
determination of this issue, i.e., accidents resulting from the raising
of snow swirls by passing automobiles are not the result of foresee-
able risks, and hence there is no potential avenue of recovery avail-
able to one thereby affected. 19 This approach has placed the court
in a straight jacket at a point in the negligence formula, and in an
area of potential liability, which should remain flexible. Public opin-
ion being a variable in regards to what constitutes a normal highway
hazard, the holding of Metts may very well prove to be a burden
if a stronger factual pattern were presented.
The difficulty of a risk fragmentation approach can be seen
through an application of its reasoning to the facts in Thorton v.
Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955). In this case a negligently
driven truck in which three boys were riding skidded off the high-
way, struck a utility pole carrying high tension wires and overturned.
The wires fell on a cable fence electrifying it. Sparks rising from the
truck and the feeling of slight shocks, warned the boys electricity
had been released. Fearing the wires may have electrified the fence,
two of the boys in going for help, decided not to return to the high-
way directly above them but proceeded to a point 150 feet away
18. This appears to be what the court has done in the latter part of the opinion
when it compares snow swirls to lights of an oncoming automobile in assessing normal
highway hazards.
19. The determination of the intervening negligence issue, having been dealt with
on the assumption that Greyhound was negligent, must be regarded as dicta or an
alternative basis for the resolution of this particular case, and presumably, if none had
been present, the question of Greyhound's conduct would not be changed.
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where in attempting to go through the fence they were immediately
electrocuted. It was held that the negligent operation of the truck
was the legal cause of the passengers' death by electrocution. The
defendant raised the issue of foreseeability,20 but Justice Musmanno,
speaking for the court, dismissed the argument finding foreseeability
was consistent with the fact that "[a]nyone who creates a mortal
hazard must anticipate that the innocent person caught within the
orbit of danger will endeavor to save his life."' This he supported by
the proposition that only the general character of injuries must be
forseeable. 22
Applying a risk fragmentation analysis, the initial question to be
asked would be whether the electrocution resulted from a risk or
hazard the foreseeability of which rendered the driver's conduct negli-
gent. If the injury had resulted from the overturning of the truck there
would be no problem, nor would there be a serious problem if the
plaintiffs, while dazed, had simply crossed the fence at the point of the
accident, although the foreseeability of this is less. Here they knew the
wire had charged the fence and had gone 150 feet up the roadway
before attempting to cross. By fragmenting the risks involved in poor
driving and looking only to this particular hazard, the answer must
be it is unforeseeable because it is a mere possibility, not something
one would have to worry about. The result of this analysis would be
that, although the driver's conduct may have been unreasonable for
numerous other reasons, it cannot be negligent as regards the electro-
cution. The court having found this hazard to be foreseeable, it is
submitted accidents arising from the creation of snow swirls must also
be within the realm of foreseeability.
The approach of a general class of harms enabled the Thorton court
to satisfy the foreseeability requirement and proceed to the difficult
question of intervening cause. However, by using a risk fragmentation
analysis, potential liability would be foreclosed at the initial stage
and the question of intervening cause unnecessary to be resolved.2 3
20. Defendant relied on Jacobs v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 584, 5 A.2d 176 (1939) for
the proposition that conduct creating an unreasonable risk of harm is not negligent if
not anticipated to create any harm to the plaintiff.
21. Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 594-95, 112 A.2d 344, 347 (1955).
22. The court cites Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort", 25 HARV. L. REV. 103,
238 (1911-12): "What must be foreseen, in order to establish negligence is 'harm in the
abstract, not harm in the concrete.' The defendant need not foresee 'that an injury
should occur.' He need only forsee that some injury of a like general character is not
unlikely to result from failure to use care."
23. A similar result is found in Metts where the issue of intervening cause is super-
fluous after the initial finding .of no unreasonable conduct on the part of Greyhound.
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Therefore, it is submitted the two approaches cannot be deemed con-
sistent unless the risk fragmentation analysis is in part a guise for the
determining of scope of liability problems on more than a simple
application of its elements. The court may utilize a Thorton approach
or simply affirm a jury determination on a strong factual pattern in
a case involving "unforseeable consequences". However, this serves as
a bypass to the sometimes difficult question of where do we cut off
negligence. A considered evaluation of numerous factors, including
those mentioned above, applied through a general class of harms,
would increase judicial integrity and certainty when facing this type
of problem. The alternative of risk fragmentation leaves us simply
with the statement that this hazard is unforeseeable.
The use of risk fragmentation is consistent with Pennsylvania's ap-
proach to this type of problem, but if the court utilizes it to foreclose
liability simply on the basis of foreseeability, then it must be pre-
sumed that any accident resulting from highly unusual circumstances
presents a very difficult problem to the plaintiff. If correctly applied
the process will result in a finding of no liability in the majority of
such cases. Therefore, the rational in Metts must be understood for
exactly what it is-a seemingly innocent process whereby potential
liability may be effectively foreclosed at a very early stage in the negli-
gence formula. It also provides a vehicle, or a guise, for resolving the
difficult scope of liability problem on less than the full consideration
of factors necessary, and at a minimum, may block the resolution of
other issues which might more rationally dispose of the case.
I. Stephen Kreglow
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VOID FOR VAGUENESS-POLITICAL DEMONSTRA-
TION-In reversing a conviction based on the desecration of an Ameri-
can flag, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held the term "politi-
cal demonstration" be given a broad interpretation.
Commonwealth v. Haugh, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
Appellant-defendant Haugh was convicted in the Philadelphia Com-
mon Pleas Criminal Court of violating the Pennsylvania flag desecra-
tion statute which makes it a misdemeanor to publicly desecrate or
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